diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/signing.md')
| -rw-r--r-- | docs/signing.md | 14 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/docs/signing.md b/docs/signing.md index 58a2b5e..abcd767 100644 --- a/docs/signing.md +++ b/docs/signing.md @@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $`S`$, where: ```math -S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\; - ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\; - ECDH\left(E_A,E_E\right) +S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\; + \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\; + \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_E\right) ``` Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of @@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows: ```math -S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\; - ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\; - ECDH\left(E_A,E_B\right) +S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\; + \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\; + \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_B\right) ``` If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $`E_A`$ and @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger. If $`E_B`$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation, -because the ability to calculate $`ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_B\right)`$ requires +because the ability to calculate $`\operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)`$ requires knowledge of the private parts of either $`I_A`$ (proving Alice's involvement) or $`E_B`$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that *both* Alice and Bob |