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authorpedroGitt <pedro.contreiras@amdocs.com>2016-11-23 00:04:58 +0100
committerpedroGitt <pedro.contreiras@amdocs.com>2016-11-23 00:04:58 +0100
commit7a6897642baa8fc5d9d9f14c80fc4f201cfe2173 (patch)
tree9325a7d7d3ac40747f49af22378dcf9bc5c0dd0b /docs/olm.rst
parentc725a561a283f508e68516ded86d141214f5ea06 (diff)
parentf6c05be8c5d35e725a8a2ed5ad661398ac9f8cd2 (diff)
Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into pedroc/android_e2e_dev
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/olm.rst')
-rw-r--r--docs/olm.rst37
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/docs/olm.rst b/docs/olm.rst
index 99417e0..093cb47 100644
--- a/docs/olm.rst
+++ b/docs/olm.rst
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ Initial setup
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The setup takes four Curve25519_ inputs: Identity keys for Alice and Bob,
-:math:`I_A` and :math:`I_B`, and ephemeral keys for Alice and Bob,
+:math:`I_A` and :math:`I_B`, and one-time keys for Alice and Bob,
:math:`E_A` and :math:`E_B`. A shared secret, :math:`S`, is generated using
`Triple Diffie-Hellman`_. The initial 256 bit root key, :math:`R_0`, and 256
bit chain key, :math:`C_{0,0}`, are derived from the shared secret using an
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ Olm Authenticated Encryption
Version 1
~~~~~~~~~
-Version 1 of Olm uses AES-256_ in CBC_ mode with `PCKS#7`_ padding for
+Version 1 of Olm uses AES-256_ in CBC_ mode with `PKCS#7`_ padding for
encryption and HMAC-SHA-256_ (truncated to 64 bits) for authentication. The
256 bit AES key, 256 bit HMAC key, and 128 bit AES IV are derived from the
message key using HKDF-SHA-256_ using the default salt and an info of
@@ -298,6 +298,37 @@ and the IV :math:`AES\_IV_{i,j}` to give the cipher-text, :math:`X_{i,j}`.
Then the entire message (including the Version Byte and all Payload Bytes) are
passed through HMAC-SHA-256. The first 8 bytes of the MAC are appended to the message.
+Message authentication concerns
+-------------------------------
+
+To avoid unknown key-share attacks, the application must include identifying
+data for the sending and receiving user in the plain-text of (at least) the
+pre-key messages. Such data could be a user ID, a telephone number;
+alternatively it could be the public part of a keypair which the relevant user
+has proven ownership of.
+
+.. admonition:: Example attacks
+
+ 1. Alice publishes her public Curve25519 identity key, :math:`I_A`. Eve
+ publishes the same identity key, claiming it as her own. Bob downloads
+ Eve's keys, and associates :math:`I_A` with Eve. Alice sends a message to
+ Bob; Eve intercepts it before forwarding it to Bob. Bob believes the
+ message came from Eve rather than Alice.
+
+ This is prevented if Alice includes her user ID in the plain-text of the
+ pre-key message, so that Bob can see that the message was sent by Alice
+ originally.
+
+ 2. Bob publishes his public Curve25519 identity key, :math:`I_B`. Eve
+ publishes the same identity key, claiming it as her own. Alice downloads
+ Eve's keys, and associates :math:`I_B` with Eve. Alice sends a message to
+ Eve; Eve cannot decrypt it, but forwards it to Bob. Bob believes the
+ Alice sent the message to him, wheras Alice intended it to go to Eve.
+
+ This is prevented by Alice including the user ID of the intended recpient
+ (Eve) in the plain-text of the pre-key message. Bob can now tell that the
+ message was meant for Eve rather than him.
+
IPR
---
@@ -323,4 +354,4 @@ an entirely new implementation written by the Matrix.org team.
.. _`SHA-256`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6234
.. _`AES-256`: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf
.. _`CBC`: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38a/sp800-38a.pdf
-.. _`PCKS#7`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315
+.. _`PKCS#7`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315