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authorRichard van der Hoff <richard@matrix.org>2019-11-08 14:11:05 +0000
committerRichard van der Hoff <richard@matrix.org>2019-11-08 14:11:05 +0000
commit930c4677547ebb3058680a9c3ad88186bb2030da (patch)
treecdf92f7d3bf3a010f111aa2ac112d520d2637908 /docs/signing.md
parent04690658558fd84cd635ee8dd34b163cccfcf420 (diff)
Update signing.md to use operatorname
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/signing.md')
-rw-r--r--docs/signing.md14
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/docs/signing.md b/docs/signing.md
index 58a2b5e..abcd767 100644
--- a/docs/signing.md
+++ b/docs/signing.md
@@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $`S`$,
where:
```math
-S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
- ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
- ECDH\left(E_A,E_E\right)
+S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
+ \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
+ \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_E\right)
```
Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of
@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in
deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows:
```math
-S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
- ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
- ECDH\left(E_A,E_B\right)
+S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
+ \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
+ \operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_B\right)
```
If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $`E_A`$ and
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger.
If $`E_B`$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary
transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now
show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation,
-because the ability to calculate $`ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_B\right)`$ requires
+because the ability to calculate $`\operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)`$ requires
knowledge of the private parts of either $`I_A`$ (proving Alice's
involvement) or $`E_B`$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the
signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that *both* Alice and Bob