diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | include/olm/error.h | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | include/olm/sas.h | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | javascript/olm_sas.js | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | javascript/test/sas.spec.js | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/error.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/sas.c | 12 |
6 files changed, 44 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/include/olm/error.h b/include/olm/error.h index ee2187c..17e819d 100644 --- a/include/olm/error.h +++ b/include/olm/error.h @@ -53,10 +53,10 @@ enum OlmErrorCode { OLM_INPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL = 15, - // Not an error code, just here to pad out the enum past 16 because - // otherwise the compiler warns about a redunant check. If you're - // adding an error code, replace this one! - OLM_ERROR_NOT_INVENTED_YET = 16, + /** + * SAS doesn't have their key set. + */ + OLM_SAS_THEIR_KEY_NOT_SET = 16, /* remember to update the list of string constants in error.c when updating * this list. */ diff --git a/include/olm/sas.h b/include/olm/sas.h index ee44eff..4a5e751 100644 --- a/include/olm/sas.h +++ b/include/olm/sas.h @@ -105,6 +105,15 @@ size_t olm_sas_set_their_key( void * their_key, size_t their_key_length ); +/** Checks if their key was set. + * + * @param[in] sas the SAS object. + * + */ +int olm_sas_is_their_key_set( + OlmSAS *sas +); + /** Generate bytes to use for the short authentication string. * * @param[in] sas the SAS object. @@ -114,6 +123,9 @@ size_t olm_sas_set_their_key( * @param[out] output the output buffer. * @param[in] output_length the size of the output buffer. For hex-based SAS * as in the Matrix spec, this will be 5. + * + * @return `olm_error()` on failure. If their key wasn't set then + * `olm_sas_last_error()` will be `SAS_THEIR_KEY_NOT_SET`. */ size_t olm_sas_generate_bytes( OlmSAS * sas, diff --git a/javascript/olm_sas.js b/javascript/olm_sas.js index 5cf3fb0..38535d5 100644 --- a/javascript/olm_sas.js +++ b/javascript/olm_sas.js @@ -42,6 +42,12 @@ SAS.prototype['set_their_key'] = restore_stack(function(their_key) { ); }); +SAS.prototype['is_their_key_set'] = restore_stack(function() { + return sas_method(Module['_olm_sas_is_their_key_set'])( + this.ptr + ) ? true : false; +}); + SAS.prototype['generate_bytes'] = restore_stack(function(info, length) { var info_array = array_from_string(info); var info_buffer = stack(info_array); diff --git a/javascript/test/sas.spec.js b/javascript/test/sas.spec.js index af7ea65..4ab4120 100644 --- a/javascript/test/sas.spec.js +++ b/javascript/test/sas.spec.js @@ -50,4 +50,13 @@ describe("sas", function() { bob.set_their_key(alice.get_pubkey()); expect(alice.calculate_mac("test", "MAC").toString()).toEqual(bob.calculate_mac("test", "MAC").toString()); }); + + it('should fail to generate bytes if their key is not set', function () { + expect(alice.is_their_key_set()).toBeFalsy(); + expect(() => { + alice.generate_bytes("SAS", 5); + }).toThrow(); + alice.set_their_key(bob.get_pubkey()); + expect(alice.is_their_key_set()).toBeTruthy(); + }); }); diff --git a/src/error.c b/src/error.c index 5147b5c..7d39637 100644 --- a/src/error.c +++ b/src/error.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ static const char * ERRORS[] = { "BAD_LEGACY_ACCOUNT_PICKLE", "BAD_SIGNATURE", "OLM_INPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL", + "OLM_SAS_THEIR_KEY_NOT_SET" }; const char * _olm_error_to_string(enum OlmErrorCode error) @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ struct OlmSAS { enum OlmErrorCode last_error; struct _olm_curve25519_key_pair curve25519_key; uint8_t secret[CURVE25519_SHARED_SECRET_LENGTH]; + int their_key_set; }; const char * olm_sas_last_error( @@ -95,14 +96,25 @@ size_t olm_sas_set_their_key( } _olm_decode_base64(their_key, their_key_length, their_key); _olm_crypto_curve25519_shared_secret(&sas->curve25519_key, their_key, sas->secret); + sas->their_key_set = 1; return 0; } +int olm_sas_is_their_key_set( + OlmSAS *sas +) { + return sas->their_key_set; +} + size_t olm_sas_generate_bytes( OlmSAS * sas, const void * info, size_t info_length, void * output, size_t output_length ) { + if (!sas->their_key_set) { + sas->last_error = OLM_SAS_THEIR_KEY_NOT_SET; + return (size_t)-1; + } _olm_crypto_hkdf_sha256( sas->secret, sizeof(sas->secret), NULL, 0, |